SECURITY MERIDINATION

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Washington 25, D.C.

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SPDM-455-51 23 November 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL KILBOURNE JOHNSTON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: CIA/OPC Strategic Plan.

Reference: Memorandum for Chief, JSPD from ADPC, dated 5 November 1951, same subject as above, (TS No. 67147).

- 1. The referenced plan has been submitted to a preliminary review in this office and, as a result, I outline below my tentative comments on the present draft. It should be noted that because of the scope of the plan and the relative shortness of time available for an examination of its military aspects, I cannot comment completely at this time. In addition, the plan has been considered only within this office and has not been made available to military agencies to which it would be of direct concern.
- 2. While I appreciate the fact that your chartered responsibilities involve many objectives which go well beyond that of support to the military in time of war, I cannot help but feel that that objective has been relegated to such a low priority that a real potential might never be developed. While granting that the prevention of a war with the Soviet Union is the ultimate hope and that your plan is designed to that objective, we must still realise that the threat of global war has increased and our national strategy must be planned against the possibility that overt aggression on the part of the Soviet Union may force war upon us. In previous comments on the first draft of the plan, it was noted that you were providing for proceeding concurrently with preparations for a general war. As presently outlined, however, those preparations are allocated an Administrative Priority Percentage Rating (APPR) of thirty percent (30%) within Priority Three. As regards Europe alone, you will recall the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, "The program of the Office of Policy Coordination in Europe should be oriented toward

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planned maximum emphasis on preparations for operations, beginning on D-day which will be a direct and immediate contribution to the retardation of Soviet advance in Western Europe." That view, being accepted by the Director of Central Intelligence, was reflected in your Strategic War Plan. However, as presently conceived, preparations for the War Plan are embodied in the Cold War Plan, again on a Priority Three basis with the APPR of 30%. With the interpretation that nothing should be accomplished on a lower priority item which would be detrimental to one of a higher priority, I am seriously concerned that only a minimum potential will be developed for that vital support for which we are dependent upon you. Specifically, I am concerned that a minimum, rather than a maximum, covert resource may exist for the direct and immediate contribution to the retardation of Soviet advance in Western Europe. It appears urgent that adjustment be made in the pan in order that a real capability may be developed in the event of war.

- 3. The matter of the employment of the cold war covert resources and their availability as a contribution to the national military strategy in time of war, plus the manner in which that is to be accomplished is an important part of the plan as a whole. I will be very interested in seeing Part III, Emergency Transition Plan when it is available for comment.
- 4. Since the logistic support required from the Department of Defense is not included in the draft plan at present, no consideration has been given to that aspect. In principle, of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that your operations should be supported by the Department of Defense and such support will generally be provided to the point where your requirements might conflict with military programs affecting the national security. In such event, the matter would be settled by mutual agreement, or be submitted to higher authority.
- 5. I concur, therefore, that the plan is adequate for submission to the Psychological Strategy Board as a statement of the scope and pace of covert operations, but not adequate as to timing or the allocation of priorities among those operations. I will be happy to discuss the plan in detail with you at the proposed meeting.

(signed): Armand Hopkins for J. D. BALMER Brigadier General, USA, Chief